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Abstract 
This study empirically examines diffusion of labor standards from origin to host countries by 
investigating whether better labor standards of MNCs’ origin countries are correlated with higher 
wages of workers in host countries in Africa. MNCs originating from countries with more rights of 
association and collective bargain and those coming from countries with unions that have strong wage 
bargaining power are found to pay significantly higher wages to their workers in host countries. These 
findings highlight that, although domestic policies and institutions may be important determinants of 
labor-related standards, they do not operate in isolation from external influences coming from origin 
countries. 
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1. Introduction  
There is often a concern raised by human right activist, consumers and corporate shareholders about 
worker’s rights and working conditions, especially in developing countries. This concern arises from 
an obvious consequence of increased global competition among multinational companies (MNCs) that 
resulted in negligence of worker’s rights, unhealthy working environment, lower payments, and use of 
child labor, among others. The incidences of workers’ rights violation in many parts of developing 
countries, together with increased multinational production, raise an important research and policy 
question. How do MNCs affect the governance of labor‐related issues? To what extent can 
labor‐related practices of MNCs be traced back to the characteristics of the national business system 
from which MNCs originate? And can labor related standards and practices of MNCs be transferred 
from origin to host countries?  
Despite the importance of these questions, little literature to date has examined them in a 
systematic, cross‐country analysis. Much of the research trying to link labor-related outcomes with 
MNCs focus on demonstrating whether violation of workers right exist in specific cases of big 
individual companies (Locke et al., 2007). Even the few existing cross-country studies focus on the 
link between labor standards and MNCs at the aggregate national level, rather than the industry and 
the firm level. For example, Mosely (2011) generates a large set of data on collective labor standards 
for the period 1985-2002, where she finds that higher levels of FDI are associated with greater respect 
for collective labor standards.  
In this study, we examine diffusion of labor standards from origin to host countries using a cross 
country analysis of MNCs operating in Africa. We specifically investigate whether better labor 
standards of MNCs’ origin countries are correlated with higher wages of workers that MNCs pay in 
the host countries. We use two measures of labor standards of origin countries; namely the right of 
association and collective bargain and unions’ role in wage bargaining1. We investigate this using a 
unique firm level dataset from UNIDO’s Africa Investor Survey, which was collected in 2010 on more 
than 1300 foreign firms from 19 countries (UNIDO, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that looks at whether corporate governance practices can be transferred from origin to host 
countries using cross-country analysis in an African perspective.  
We find that multinational firms that originate from countries with more rights of association and 
collective bargain pay significantly higher wages to their workers in the host countries than 
multinational firms originating from countries with restrictive rights of association and collective 
bargain. These results are found after controlling for various firm level and host country characteristics 
and alternatively using host country fixed-effects to account for unobservable heterogeneity in host 
countries that may affect wages. We also find consistent results when we use union’s role in wage 
bargaining as a proxy for labor standards in origin countries. Multinational firms originating from 
countries with unions that have strong bargaining power in wages pay significantly higher wages to 
their workers in the host countries.  
The findings of this study contribute to existing FDI literature at least in two ways. First, it 
provides evidence contrary to the convergence theory, which states that economic integration induces 
countries to adopt common standards across firms (Berger 1996). In this study, we provide suggestive 
evidence that high level of economic integration via FDI need not necessarily lead to convergence in 
labor standards and practices and that it may differ across firms depending on where MNCs are 
                                                     
1
 The data for these indicators of labor standards is obtained from Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade 
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pact (ICTWSS). ICTWSS contains annual data for all OECD and 
EU member states with some additional data for emerging economies of Brazil; China; India; Indonesia; Russia; and 
South Africa; and it runs from 1960 till 2010. 
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headquartered. Second, this study contributes to the ‘race to the bottom’ debate by demonstrating that 
competition for FDI in developing countries need not necessarily result in weaker labor standards in 
host countries (Collinsworth, Goold, and Harvey, 1994; Drezner, 2001). Globalization critics argue 
that increased competition for FDI generates a situation where host countries follow weak regulatory 
standards, allowing MNCs to adopt lax corporate practices (Neumayer, 2006). Despite these 
arguments, there are evidences that suggest that economic integration, under certain conditions, may 
create incentives for MNCsto transfer and implement better standards ‘that are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced 
by, if not comparable to, the ones adopted in the home country’ (Prakash and Potoski, 2007; p: 729).  
This study further provides important policy implications for governments in host countries. The 
evidence that MNCs have potentials to transfer better practices from origin to host countries indicate 
that developing country governments could benefit if they strategically attract FDI from countries that 
demonstrate better corporate governance practices such as better labor regulations and standards. 
Similarly, such evidence indicate the potential that NGOs that work to safeguard better labor standards 
can have in influencing MNCs to transfer better practices to host countries in developing nations. 
International investment and trade agreement could therefore give such kind of NGOs an opportunity 
to push MNCs in the ‘right’ direction (Prakash and Potoski, 2007).  
The next section will provide a brief review of the literature discussing the mechanisms through 
which labor standards can diffuse to host countries. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive 
statistics and Section 4 is the empirical model and the variables. Section 5 presents the results and 
Section 6 is conclusion and discussion.  
2. Mechanisms through which multinational firms diffuse labor standards to host 
countries 
One mechanism through which multinational firms could affect labor standards in host economies is 
via the transfer of labor related practices from MNCs headquarters to their host‐country affiliates or 
subsidiaries. This mechanisms related to the overall spillover literature, where multinational firms are 
shown to generate a variety of positive externalities to host economies (see for example De Mello, 
1997 and Crespo and Fontoura, 2007 for a review). With respect to labor-related standards, 
multinational firms facilitate the transfer of various labor related practices from home to host countries 
for efficiency reason, where multinationals prefer to standardize their operations in order to reduce 
fixed costs associated with operating subsidiaries abroad (Pauly and Reich, 1997; Helpman et al., 
2004,). These results in multinationals implementing policies and human resource management 
practices that are similar to those used at home, and may even exceed the requirements of the host 
countries (Dasgupta et al., 2000; Prakash and Potoski, 2007). This efficiency motivation not only 
transfers various corporate practices to MNEs foreign operations, but also creates heterogeneity across 
firms in host economies rather than promoting convergence to a single model as stated in the 
convergence theory (Mosley, 2011). 
In addition to efficiency reason, multinational firms can practice better labor standards in host 
countries due to labor market competition. Efficiency seeking MNCs in particular are attracted by the 
availability of more productive labor at a relatively lower cost when investing abroad. This results in 
MNCs either hiring the most skilled workers or training workers. Given a mobile labor environment in 
different host countries, MNCs have incentives to retain their skilled workers, especially those in 
which they have invested in through training. As a consequence, multinational are expected to practice 
better labor standards either by paying their workers higher wages, or by improving the working 
environment, and so forth (Prakash and Potoski, 2007).  
Global firms that act as sources of various production and trade standards can also diffuse labor 
standard to host countries, which is sometimes similar to what they practice in their headquarters. 
Firms can work individually or as a group to set corporate codes of conduct in order to satisfy the 
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demands of corporate social responsibility (Mattli and Woods, 2009, Mosley, 2011). According to a 
study conducted by Vogel (2009), there are over 300 industries of product codes that address labor or 
environmental practices and more than 3000 global firms that issue regular reports on their social and 
environmental standards.  
The rise of corporate codes of conduct that is being followed by increasing number of MNCs is a 
reflection of the need to keep their reputation by sustaining a longer run relationship with host country 
governments, either because they intend to sell their products to local consumers or because they need 
to have a continued production presence in the host countries (Mosely, 2011). The pressure from 
various activists operating in different countries that hold MNCs legally accountable for their overseas 
practices can also increase MNCs’ incentive to meet certain labor standards ( Skippari and Pajunen, 
2010). Such pressure may trickle down to local suppliers, as MNE subsidiaries encourage their 
suppliers to adopt better corporate practices (Christmann and Taylor, 2001; Hutson, 2004). The 
increased desire of MNCs to appear ‘responsible’ has resulted in market for labor standards that are 
either firm or supply-chia specific. Such development can lead to diffusion of labor standards from 
MNCs to host countries in which they operate in.  
Another mechanism through which multinational firms can affect labor-related outcomes in host 
countries is by influencing the host country’s national legal system (Mosely, 2011). MNCs may have 
incentives to implement labor standards that may exceed what is legally required in the host country 
for various reasons. However, such practices may generate cost disadvantage to multinational firms 
compared to other multinationals or domestic firms that do not implement such labor practices, simply 
because they are not required by law in the host countries. In order to avoid this cost disadvantage, 
MNCs may lobby the host country government to improve their country’s labor standards. Such 
phenomena has been documented in various studies, especially in environmental related policies 
(Prakash and Potoski, 2007; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). For example, US-owned chemical firms 
lobbied the government of Brazil and Mexico to upgrade the regulations of the sector so as to force 
other foreign and domestic counterparts to follow the same policy (Garcia‐Johnson, 2000).  
However, MNCs lobbying host country governments to change their policies are a difficult process 
and may require longer-term investment in political relations and is expected to occur less frequently 
(Mosely, 2011).  
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
Data 
We obtain different measures of labor standards of origin countries from ICTWSS
2
, which has 
information on institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social 
pacts in 34 countries from 1960 until 2010. ICTWSS contains annual data for all OECD and EU 
member states with some additional data for emerging economies including Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa. In this study, we use two measures of labor standards of origin 
countries for the year 2010.
3
 The first measure of labor standards is the right of association and 
collective bargain, which ranges from 0=“there is no right of association and collective bargain” to 
1=“yes there is right but with major restriction”, 2= “yes there is right but with minor restriction” to 
3=“yes there is right of association and collective bargain with no restriction”. The higher the value, 
the more right workers in origin countries have in terms of association and collective bargain. The 
                                                     
2
 The dataset is compiled by Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), part of the University of 
Amsterdam. 
3
 For detailed discussion of the ICTWSS database and the codebook used to generate the different variables, please refer to 
http://www.uvaaias.net/uploaded_files/regular/ICTWSScodebook40.pdf 
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second measure of labor standard is unions’ role in wage bargaining. This variable ranges from 0 to 2, 
with 0= “union does not negotiate on wages”; 1= “union negotiates wage agreements at sector level 
allowing enterprise or company branches to vary within limits” and 2= “union negotiates enforceable 
agreements at sector level and has veto power over company agreements”. Again, the higher the value 
of this variable, the more power labor unions in specific origin country have in wage bargaining.  
We use original firm-level data collected through the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010 across 
19 Sub-Saharan Africa countries.
4
 We use the Foreign Investor Survey data, which contain a rich set 
of information on a large sample of foreign firms. The collection of the dataset followed a rigorous 
survey methodology in terms of stratified sampling (on three dimensions: sector, size and ownership) 
and interview techniques (face-to-face interviews with top-level managers of foreign- and 
domestically-owned firms). The sample was constructed in order to be representative of public and 
private for profit firms with 10 or more employees.
5
 
Our main variable, wage, is captured as average wage per full time employees in each firm. In the 
questionnaire, firms are asked to state the value of total wage bills including supplementary benefits 
that they paid to their workers in the last financial year. They are also asked to state the number of full 
time employees in the past financial year. We divide the total wage bill of a firm by number of full 
time employees in each firm to get the average wage per full time employees. The wages are adjusted 
to nominal exchange rate in USD.  
In addition to wage, the data available in the African Investor Survey are unique in that they 
provide detailed information on various aspects of firm level characteristics, performance, customer-
supplier relationships, and assistance received at the level of the firm. There is one disadvantage, 
however. Currently, the data are only available for a cross section for 2010. Hence, while we can use 
the data to unearth and describe some hitherto unknown relationships, we are careful to avoid 
interpreting these as causal effects. Nevertheless, we feel that the relationships are sufficiently 
interesting and, importantly, policy relevant to justify our analysis. This dataset is complimented by 
host country institutional and business climate indicators at the national level which is obtained from 
various sources, outlined in the coming section.  
In order to provide a first look at the relationship between origin/home country labor standards and 
the foreign investor’s behavior in host countries, we provide some summary statistics. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows the two labor standard indictors both for emerging and OECD origin countries. From 
the data set, we have relatively more information about the right of association and collective bargain 
by country of origin. However, there are some missing values for the other indicator (union’s role in 
wage bargaining). As can be seen in the table, OECD countries in general have on average better labor 
standard compared to emerging countries, both in terms of the right of association and collective 
bargain and union’s role in wage bargaining. Among emerging countries, China has more restrictive 
right of association and collective bargain than other countries. Unions in China also do not play an 
active role in wage bargaining. South Africa is the lowest performer of all the countries both in terms 
of workers right of association and collective bargain and the role of unions in wage bargaining.  
  
                                                     
4
 The countries in included in the data are Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
5
 An oversampling of relatively large firms (> 100 employees) has been adopted. 
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Table 1: Labor standard indicators of origin countries  
 Right of association 
 and collective bargain 
Union’s role in  
wage bargaining 
Emerging economies    
China 1.5 0 
India 3 - 
South Africa 0 0 
Latin America 2.5 - 
Other Asia and Oceania 2.3 0 
Average  1.86 0 
OECD countries    
Europe 2.9 1 
Scandinavia  3 1 
USA 2.5 0 
Canada 2.5 1 
Japan 3 0 
Australia 2.5 0 
New Zealand 3 0 
Average  2.77 0.42 
Source: ICTWSS database, 2010 
Among OECD countries, European countries, Japan and New Zealand have the right of associating 
and collective bargain with almost no restriction. Among European countries, Scandinavian nations 
have relatively strong unions that play a strong role in wage bargaining. Japan also has the right of 
association and collective bargain with no restriction. However, Japan’s labor union have almost no 
role in wage bargaining. The right of association and collective bargain in USA and Canada is not as 
flexible as European countries in general and Scandinavian countries, in particular. Union’s also do 
not play an active role in wage bargaining in Canada and USA.  
We now look at the percentage share of FDI by different origin countries and regions in the 19 
African countries that we have in the sample. India covers the largest share of FDI in Africa, with a 
share of almost 31%. Europe as a region has the largest share of about 33%. The largest share of FDI 
from Europe comes from France. France alone accounts for 59% of the FDI investment from Europe, 
and it is the largest investor next to India. Portugal and Italy are the second and third largest European 
investors, each covering 27% and 22% of the investment coming from Europe, respectively.  
China covers 13% of FDI in Africa and is the third largest investor coming after India and France. 
USA also has a relatively large share of FDI in Africa, with a share of 8%, being the fourth largest 
investing country in the region. Other Asia and Oceania countries and other OECD countries that 
include Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand cover 7% and 4% respectively.  
In terms of recipient (host) countries, Uganda has the largest share of FDI, with close to 17% of 
FDI in the sample being destined to this country. This is followed by Kenya with a share of 12% and 
Ghana with a share of 6%. Tanzania, Nigeria and Ethiopia each have a share of close to 6% of the FDI 
in the sample. These six countries alone account for 54% of the FDI in Africa.  
We further look at the distribution of average wages paid per full time worker by multinational 
firms in host countries with different characteristics (Table 2). There is not much difference in wages 
paid between multinational firms of different sizes. Multinational firms that are engaged in 
manufacturing sector pay relatively lower wage than those engaged in agriculture and mining, service 
and electricity and water construction. Firms that have either a local or regional orientation in 
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marketing of their final products pay relatively higher wages than globally oriented firms. Firms that 
are subsidiaries of multinational companies also pay a higher wage than stand-alone and firms owned 
by the diaspora. Similarly, firms that invested in existing local company pay higher wages than those 
that formed new Joint Venture (JV).  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of logarithm of wage across firms of different characteristics 
 # of 
observation 
Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Size 
Small 786 8.27 1.17 1.66 14.68 
Medium  448 8.13 1.31 2.45 15.87 
Large 925 8.23 1.29 1.77 14.16 
Sector  
Agriculture and Mining 145 8.14 1.11 4.64 11.34 
Manufacturing  1036 7.99 1.22 1.66 15.87 
Service 847 8.49 1.27 3.27 14.42 
Electricity and water 
construction 
137 8.37 1.42 1.77 11.86 
Market orientation 
Local  1653 8.27 1.29 1.66 14.67 
Regional  208 8.23 1.26 2.95 15.87 
Global  292 7.88 1.06 2.67 11.21 
Ownership  
Subsidiary 752 8.63 1.33 1.77 15.87 
Stand-alone 975 7.92 1.14 1.65 14.67 
Diaspora 88 8.18 1.19 5.50 10.80 
Type of Investment  
Formed a new JV 325 8.22 1.17 2.67 10.95 
Invest in existing local company  156 8.40 1.24 2.68 10.91 
Source: Author’s compilation from UNIDO’s Africa Investor Survey, 2010 
4. Empirical Model and variables 
To investigate how labor standards of MNCs’ origin country are correlated with wages that 
multinational firms pay to workers in the host countries, we estimate the following model. 
                ; (1) 
where    is logarithm of average wage per full time worker that multinational firms pay to workers in 
host country   at firm  .   is our measure of labor standards of origin country of the multinational 
firm, as described in section 3 above.
6   is a vector of various firm specific characteristics of the 
multinational firm   operating in the host country  .    indicates a vector of host country 
                                                     
6
 The right of association and collective bargain, ranging from 0= “there is no right of association and collective bargain” 
to 1 = “yes there is right but with major restriction”, 2= “yes there is right but with minor restriction” to 3= “yes there is 
right of association and collective bargain with no restriction”. Unions’ role in wage bargaining ranging from 0= “union 
does not negotiate on wages”; 1= “union negotiates wage agreements at sector level allowing enterprise or company 
branches to vary within limits” and 2= “union negotiates enforceable agreements at sector level and has veto power over 
company agreements”. 
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characteristics such as the institutional quality and the business climate, and    is an error term. All 
variables used in the model are summarized in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
The tendency to replicate and diffuse labor related practices from home to host countries may be 
greater in firms that use more sophisticated technology and require higher skilled workforce. It is 
assumed that stiffer competition to attract and retain the latter is an important driver of diffusion of 
labor related practices in more technology intensive sectors (Mosely, 2011). On the other hand it is 
less likely for more labor-intensive sectors to have upgrading of labor related practices through 
diffusion from home countries because these types of firms are ‘more sensitive to labor costs and less 
concerned with labor productivity and skills (Mosely, 2011, pp: 10). For this, we use various 
indicators of firm level characteristics in the model. These include the skill intensity of workers, which 
is captured by the ratio of skilled workers to total workers; share of female employees and share of 
foreign employees. We also control for the capital-labor ratio of the firm to capture whether the firm is 
capital or labor intensive and the output-labor ratio to capture the firm-level labor productivity. 
Additional firm-level characteristics such as the size, age and the four digit sector that the firm is 
operating in is also included in the model.  
Studies show that the way in which FDI enters the host economy also makes a difference in 
diffusion of labor related practices from home to host countries. For example, when MNCs are created 
via purchase of an existing firm, it was indicated that the transfer of labor related practices is lower 
(Crespo and Fontoura 2007, Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). On the other hand, FDI that is generated as 
a Greenfield project through creation of subsidiary of and MNC will more likely transfer labor related 
practices from home country headquarters to host country affiliates (Mosely, 2011). For this, we 
control a dummy that captures whether the firm is a subsidiary of MNC or not, stand alone or not and 
JV of foreign firm or not. If the firm is a subsidiary of MNC, proportion of sales to parent company is 
also included in the model.  
In addition to home country influence, labor related practices may also be affected by destination 
countries where multinational firms export their products. Greenhill et al., (2009) noted that trade 
serves as a mechanism to diffuse norms and practices from importing countries to exporting countries. 
For this, we control for market orientation of the firm, which is whether the firm is selling most of its 
products globally or not. We also followed the work of Greenhill et al., (2009) and controlled for 
bilateral trade context which is the weighted average of labor standards of the multinational firm’s 
export partner. It is calculated by taking the labor standard score of each firm’s export destination 
country and weighs this by the share of each multinational firm’s export to these destination 
countries.
7
 
                          ∑              
 
                  (2) 
where   indicate the exporting multinational firm; and   is the importing country.  
According to this measure, a multinational firm that exports most of its products to countries that 
practice relatively better labor standard will have a higher score of bilateral trade context.  
In addition to firm level characteristics, the diffusion of MNCs’ labor‐related standards to the host 
economy is likely to depend on the existing domestic institutions (Mosley, 2008). For example, if 
labor regulations of the host country are already well developed and strict, then MNCs labor standards 
will have a much smaller effect or no effect at all (Mosley, 2008). For this, we include various 
indicators of the host country institution and economy. The measures of institutional quality included 
in the model are protection of property rights and democracy. Indicators of the business climate such 
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 Greenhill et al., (2009) used volume of export. However, we do not have volume of export in our data set. Instead, we 
used share of export to various destination countries as a proxy. 
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as the extent to which government regulation is a burden to the private sector, transparency of 
government policy making and belief of the private sector that government services can improve 
business performance are also included. The data for these indicators with the exception of democracy 
is obtained from World Economic Forum; Global Competitiveness report of the 2010-2011 data 
platform. This dataset ranks individual countries based on their global competitiveness score from 1 
up to 7. The measure of democracy is obtained from Polity IV of 2011.  
Other host country characteristics included in the model are prevalence of foreign owned firms and 
average stock of FDI. Prevalence of foreign ownership is obtained from World Economic Forum, 
where countries are ranked from 1 up to 7, with a higher value indicating more prevalence of foreign 
owned firms. Average stock of FDI is measured for the past five years of the time of the survey and 
the data is obtained from the World Bank, World Development Indicator. Additionally, we control for 
GDP per capita of the host country, also obtained from World Development Indicator.  
5. Results 
Table 3 shows regression results of the correlation between the first measure of labor standard of 
origin countries (right of association and collective bargain) and wages set by multinational firm. We 
do the regression analysis by clustering the standard errors at host country level in order to make our t-
statistics robust to cross-country heteroskedasticity, using and OLS estimator. 
In column I, we include only the measures of labor standards. We find that multinational firms that 
originate from countries that have higher level of labor standards in terms of rights of association and 
collective bargain pay significantly higher wages to their workers in the host countries. This 
significant relationship between the right of association and collective bargain in origin countries and 
wages in host countries still persist even after controlling for firm level characteristics in column II; 
host country characteristics in column III and the four digit sector classification of firms in column IV.  
Regarding some characteristics of firms, we also find results as expected. As can be seen in column 
IV, multinational firms that are more capital intensive and employ more productive labor pay 
relatively higher wages. Similarly, multinational firms that are subsidiaries of a multinational company 
also pay a significantly higher wages. We also find a marginally significant effect for our measure of 
bilateral trade context, which depicts that multinational firms that export most of their products to 
countries with relatively higher labor standards pay higher wages to their workers in the host 
countries.  
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Table 3: Correlation between right of association and collective bargain in origin country and 
wage (Dependent variable: logarithm of average wage at firm level) 
 I II III IV 
Right of association and collective bargain 0.68*** 0.47** 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) 
Age of establishment  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Skill intensity  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of female employment  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of foreign employment  -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of capital labor ratio  0.07* 0.12*** 0.12*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Log or output labor ratio  0.25*** 0.18** 0.18*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Proportion of sales to parent company  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Company is JV of foreign firm (d)  0.09 0.07 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Company is subsidiary of foreign firm (d)  0.26** 0.29*** 0.25*** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Company is stand-alone (d)  -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Medium size company (d)   -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Large company (d)  -0.12** -0.05 -0.07 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
Market orientation global (d)  -0.29 -0.31* -0.23 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) 
Market orientation regional (d)  -0.04 -0.16 -0.16 
  (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) 
Bilateral trade context  0.07 0.07 0.09* 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Property rights   -0.19 -0.18 
   (0.18) (0.17) 
Democracy   0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Burden of govt. regulation   -1.00*** -0.84*** 
   (0.31) (0.26) 
Transparency of govt. policy making   0.48 0.28 
   (0.34) (0.30) 
Govt. services for improved business performance   0.21 0.21 
   (0.22) (0.22) 
Prevalence of foreign owned firms   0.00 0.10 
   (0.13) (0.10) 
Log of GDP per capita   0.43*** 0.46*** 
   (0.14) (0.12) 
Log of FDI net flow   -0.02 -0.04 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 6.31*** 3.07*** 2.99 3.66** 
 (0.44) (0.87) (1.88) (1.71) 
ISIC fixed effects −      −         − Yes 
     
pseudo R
2
 0.051 0.349 0.406 0.439 
N 1331 1262 1198 1198 
Standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; standard errors clustered at host country level. 
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Table 4 shows the regression result using the second measure of labor standard of origin countries, 
(union’s role in wage bargaining). We find similar result as in table 3. Multinational firms that 
originate from countries with strong unions that play an important role in wage bargaining pay 
relatively higher wages to their workers in the host countries. This result is consistent even after 
controlling form firm level characteristics in column II, host country characteristics in column III and 
the four digit sector classification in column IV. We also find that capital intensive firms and those 
that relay on more productive labor pay higher wages. Multinational firms that are subsidiaries of 
multinational firms also pay higher wages.  
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Table 4: Correlation between Union's role in wage bargaining in origin country and wage  
(Dependent variable: logarithm of average wage at firm level) 
 I II III IV 
Union's role in wage bargaining 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.38*** 0.36** 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) 
Age of establishment  0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Skill intensity  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of female employment  0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of foreign employment  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of capital labor ratio  0.07** 0.11** 0.11** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log or output labor ratio  0.26*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Proportion of sales to parent company  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Company is JV of foreign firm (d)  0.10 0.11 0.13 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Company is subsidiary of foreign firm (d)  0.09 0.18*** 0.15* 
  (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
Company is stand-alone (d)  -0.13 -0.15 -0.18* 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Medium size company (d)   -0.16 -0.09 -0.13 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) 
Large company (d)  -0.11 0.01 -0.05 
  (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) 
Market orientation global (d)  0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) 
Market orientation regional (d)  -0.01 -0.19 -0.26 
  (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) 
Bilateral trade context  -0.18 -0.12 -0.20 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) 
Property rights   -0.05 -0.07 
   (0.20) (0.20) 
Democracy   0.02 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Burden of govt. regulation   -0.93** -0.79*** 
   (0.32) (0.26) 
Transparency of govt. policy making   0.37 0.19 
   (0.36) (0.32) 
Govt. services for improved business performance   0.36 0.33 
   (0.20) (0.22) 
Prevalence of foreign owned firms   -0.03 0.03 
   (0.15) (0.13) 
Log of GDP per capita   0.32** 0.40*** 
   (0.12) (0.11) 
Log of FDI net flow   -0.00 -0.02 
   (0.05) (0.04) 
ISIC fixed effects −      −         − Yes 
 
Constant 
 
8.04*** 
 
4.09*** 
  
 3.19** 
 
3.50** 
 (0.19) (0.47) (1.36) (1.47) 
R
2
 0.049 0.368 0.417 0.454 
N 1006 950 903 903 
Standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; standard errors clustered at host country level 
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Robustness check 
In this section, we repeat above specified regression by using host country fixed effects instead of host 
country characteristics. This is done in order to account for any heterogeneity across host countries 
that would lead to wage differences. As can be seen in table 5, even after controlling for host country 
fixed effects, we find that multinational firms that originate from countries with relatively higher labor 
standards both in terms of right of association and collective bargain and union’s role in wage 
bargaining, pay a significantly higher wages to their workers in the host counties.  
Table 5: Robustness check using host country fixed effects  
(Dependent variable: logarithm of average wage at firm level) 
 I II 
Right of association and collective bargain 0.49* − 
 (0.24)  
Union's role in wage bargaining − 0.46*** 
  (0.14) 
Age of establishment 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Skill intensity 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of female employment -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of foreign employment 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of capital labor ratio 0.08** 0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Log or output labor ratio 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Proportion of sales to parent company -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Company is JV of foreign firm (d) 0.09 0.14 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
Company is subsidiary of foreign firm (d) 0.21** 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.11) 
Company is stand-alone (d) -0.03 -0.15 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Medium size company (d)  -0.13 -0.21 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Large company (d) -0.16 -0.15 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Market orientation global (d) -0.12 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
Market orientation regional (d) -0.09 -0.19 
 (0.09) (0.13) 
Bilateral trade context 0.06 -0.11 
 (0.04) (0.16) 
Constant 4.43*** 4.85*** 
 (1.00) (0.44) 
ISIC fixed effects Yes Yes 
Host country fixed effects Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.435 0.447 
N 1262 950 
Standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01; standard errors clustered at host country level. 
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6. Conclusion and discussion  
In this study, we examine conditions under which MNCs transfer their corporate governance practices 
from origin to host countries, by focusing on various labor standards of origin countries using a cross 
country analysis in Africa. We specifically investigate whether better labor standards of MNCs’ origin 
countries are correlated with higher wages for workers in the host countries. We use two measures of 
labor standards of origin countries; namely the right of association and collective bargain and unions’ 
role in wage bargaining. We investigate this using a unique firm level dataset from UNIDO’s Africa 
Investor Survey. 
We find that multinational firms that originate from countries that have more rights of association 
and collective bargain pay significantly higher wages to their workers in host countries than 
multinational firms originating from countries with restrictive rights of association and collective 
bargain. We also find consistent results when we use union’s role in wage bargaining as a proxy for 
labor standards in origin countries. Multinational firms originating from countries with unions that 
have strong bargaining power in wages pay significantly higher wages to their workers in the host 
countries. We checked the robustness of our results by controlling for different firm level and host 
country characteristics and by alternatively controlling for host country fixed effect to account for 
unobservable heterogeneity in host countries that may affect wages. In all of these specifications, the 
positive and significant correlation between the two measures of origin country labor standards and 
higher wages in host countries persist.  
These results support two hypotheses through which multinational firms facilitate the transfer of 
various labor related practices from home to host countries. The first one is the efficiency reason, 
where multinationals prefer to standardize their operations in order to reduce fixed costs associated 
with operating subsidiaries abroad (Pauly and Reich 1997; Helpman et al 2004). This mechanism is 
further supported by the findings in this study that firms that are subsidiaries of MNCspay higher 
wages.  
In addition to efficiency reason, the tendency to replicate and diffuse labor related practices from 
home to host countries may be greater in firms that use higher technology and skilled workers as the 
competition to attract and retain skilled workers in such type of sectors is more important (Mosely, 
2011).Consistent with this mechanism, we find that multinational firms that are more capital intensive 
and employ more productive labor pay relatively higher wages. 
Evidences from this paper provide important policy implications for governments in host countries. 
Host country governments should appreciate FDI’s ‘investing up’ potential in transferring better 
practices and norms to host countries. Developing country governments could benefit if they 
strategically attract FDI from countries that demonstrate better corporate governance practices such as 
better labor standards. Similarly, international investment and trade agreement can provide NGOs that 
work to safeguard better labor standards an opportunity to influence MNCs potential in transferring 
better practices to host countries in developing countries.  
A possible caveat of this study is its reliance on cross-sectional data, which does not allow us to see 
the effects of inter-temporal changes of labor standards of origin countries. That we cannot entirely 
control for possible time variant unobservable factors that can be correlated with labor standards of 
origin countries and simultaneously affect wages paid in the host countries is another limitation. 
Despite these shortcomings, the results of this study provide suggestive evidence that, although 
domestic policies and institutions are likely to be important determinants of various labor-related 
standards, they do not operate in isolation from external influences of those coming from origin 
countries. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
Variables  Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
Log of average wage at firm level 8.22 1.27 1.66 15.87 
Right of association and collective bargain 2.80 0.45 1 3 
Union's role in wage bargaining 0.55 0.50 0 2 
Age of establishment 16.92 12.93 1 60 
Skill intensity 47.79 31.92 1 100 
Share of female employment 29.71 26.12 1 100 
Share of foreign employment 15.70 26.25 1 100 
Log of capital labor ratio 9.44 1.86 2.28 18.21 
Log or output labor ratio 10.46 1.69 3.05 18.65 
Proportion of sales to parent company 0.12 0.31 0 1 
Company is JV of foreign firm (d) 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Company is subsidiary of foreign firm (d) 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Company is stand-alone (d) 0.44 0.49 0 1 
Medium size company (d) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Large company (d) 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Market orientation global (d) 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Market orientation regional (d) 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Bilateral trade context 0.27 0.76 0 3 
Property rights 3.77 0.49 2.45 5.19 
Democracy  4.57 3.07 0 10 
Burden of govt. regulation 3.56 0.45 2.77 5.29 
Transparency of govt. policy making 4.07 0.48 3.00 5.51 
Govt. services for improved business performance 3.63 3.63 2.13 4.11 
Prevalence of foreign owned firms 4.71 0.63 2.83 5.47 
Log of FDI net flow 20.09 1.42 14.51 22.78 
Log of GDP per capita 6.02 0.46 4.92 7.58 
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